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Abstract
The European Investment Bank finances projects of medium and large sized
firms through ”project loans”. Because they involve favorable conditions such as low
interest rates and a long repayment period, there is a question of whether the EIB
could be distorting market competition and reinforcing eventual dominant positions.
This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis. Using data from Portuguese
firms between 2007 and 2015, we use an empirically robust estimator to assess the
impact of project loans on firms’ market shares, which proxies market power. As
a byproduct of this research, we also investigate the impact on firms’ investment
rate. We find no evidence that assisted firms experience abnormal increases in their
market shares in the years that follow the attribution of the loans. Thus, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that project loans do not distort market competition.
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1 Introduction
According to the Article 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
the mission of the European Investiment Bank (EIB) is to contribute to the “balanced
and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union” by granting
loans on a not-for-profit basis for projects promoting regional development, modernizing
undertakings and of overall common interest to several Member States.
In practice, this mission materializes in a variety of goals. From promoting convergence
among Member States, developing the transport networks, or accelerating the transition
to a green economy, a broad spectrum of objectives could justify the bank’s intervention.
Honohan (1995) argues that the main public policy role of the EIB is to stimulate bank
competition and efficiency in regions where the local banking system is costly and ineffi-
cient. The role of the bank of financing large projects when significant amounts of capital
are difficult to raise is also at the root of its creation.
Although the EIB lending activity has the potential to mitigate certain market distor-
tions, it can create others. It’s attractive conditions, which often include low interest rates
and a long repayment period, could distort competition in goods and services markets
by giving the eligible firms an advantage over their rivals. If the EIB activity resulted
in artificial advantages for some large firms, this would be inconsistent with Article 140
of the Financial Regulation of the EU (Regulation 966/2012), which states that the EU
financial instruments should only be used in a way that does not distort competition in
the internal market.
Several studies have been conducted by the EIB’s Evaluation Department in regard to
the ex-post evaluation of the bank’s lending, both on a microeconomic level (Thommson
and Goodwin, 2005) and on a macroeconomic level (EIB, 2018). To our knowledge, studies
aiming at evaluating the impact of the EIB on market competition have never been made.
This work project aims to give a first result to this matter by measuring whether the
beneficiary firms from project loans, which are large by Portuguese standards, experience
abnormal increases in their market shares, which proxies market power. As a byproduct
of this research, we also investigate the impact on firms’ investment rate. We focus our
analysis in Portugal, over the period from 2007 and 2015, with a sample comprising 45
project loans amounting to 3.927M euros disbursed by the bank. In the estimation, we
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use a difference-in-differences matching estimator (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997)
that controls for observed and unobserved time-invariant selection bias.
This work project is structured as follows. Section 2 provides information about the
EIB activity in Portugal. Section 3 contains a literature review. Section 4 explains
the methodology used. Section 5 presents the dataset and variables used, together with
descriptive statistics. Section 6 describes de empirical findings and section 7 summarizes
our results.
2 Background
The European Investment Bank (EIB), often referred to as the EU bank, was stablished
in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome. It is a long-term credit bank that offers attractive
rates and specializes in the financing of infrastructure and other fixed capital. The EIB
signed its first project in Portugal in April 1976, funding the construction of a thermal
power plant in Setu´bal. It was after Portugal officially joined the EU that its relationship
with the EIB became more intense. Ever since, the EIB has been an active player in
Portugal.
Being a cohesion country, Portugal is one of the EU Member States primarily targeted
for convergence policies. Also, all Portuguese regions apart from Lisbon and Algarve are
classified as “less developed regions” 1 with regards to the to the EU Regional Policy
from 2014 to 2020. Accordingly, Portugal is one of the countries where EU economic and
social cohesions objectives are most significant, thus explaining the strong actuation of
the EIB. In 2017, the EIB loans to Portugal ammounted to 9.9% of the its GDP (Maurin
and Santos, 2018), well above the EU average exposure of 3.4% of the GDP. Nonetheless,
other objectives justify the EIB intervention in Portugal. From accelerating the transition
to a green economy, promoting connectivity among Member States with more developed
transport networks, or increasing the reliability of the energy supply, a broad spectrum
of projects in Portugal could be financed by the bank.
Honohan (1995) argues that the main public policy role of the EIB is to stimulate
bank competition and efficiency in regions where the local banking market is inefficient.
The EIB internvetion has the potential to directly lower the funding costs of valuable
1By having a GDP per capital smaller than 75% of the EU27 average.
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projects, and also to induce efficiency in the domestic banking market through increased
competition. The role of the bank of financing large projects when significant amounts of
capital are difficult to raise is also at the root of its creation.
The EIB categorizes its lending activity into different types of loans designed to reach
different kinds of entities. For instance, ”intermediated loans”, conducted through local
banks, are designed to support essentially small-and-medium-sized businesses. Support to
larger firms is mainly made throught ”project loans”. Only midcaps and large corporates
are eligible for these loans which typically have a minimum lending value of around 25M
euros that should cover a maximum of 50% of the investment costs. In addition to a long
replacement period which can be as high as 30 years, project loans often include interest
rates lower than the market would generally require. The latter type of loans will be the
one analyzed in this work project.
3 Literature Review
Previous work has been done to quantify the impact of the EIB overall activity. At the
macroeconomic level, a recent study (EIB, 2018) estimates the bank’s impact through a
dynamic spatial computable general equilibrium model, finding that the banks’ activity
within the EU between 2015 and 2016 will increase GDP by 2.3% and create 2.25 million
jobs by 2020.
At a microeconomic level, the bank’s Evaluation Department conducts ex-post eval-
uation studies divided in distinct categories. “Technical studies” such as the analysis
on several Public–Private Partnership (PPP) projects (Thommson and Goodwin, 2005),
evaluate the projects financed by the bank based on performance indicators and KPIs.
“Thematic studies” analyze the developments in specific objectives of the EIB. For ex-
ample, a study was made regarding the EIB’s climate action activity within the EU be-
tween 2010 and 2014 where the bank’s overall lending contributions to renewable energies
projects was assessed (EIB, 2015).
To our knowledge, studies aiming to evaluate the impact of the EIB activity on com-
petition have never been made. This work project aims to give a first result to this matter
by measuring whether firms that receive project loans experience abnormal increases in
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their market shares, which proxies market power. To allow for a better understanding of
the loan’s impact, the effect on investment is also assessed.
More generally, there are a number of studies that access the firm-level impact of
government lending programs on firm size. Maggioni et al. (1999) analyzes an Italian
government program comprising loans with reduced interest rates and found no impact
on firm’s size, measured as sales. Similiar results were found by Kim et al. (2015),
who analyzed a Korean government lending program designed to support R&D. Kang
and Heshmati (2008) studied the impact of another Korean credit guarantee program
on firm performance and found no impact on firm’s sales. Dvoulety´ (2017) analyzed a
Czech program supporting enterprises with zero interest soft loans and credit guarantees
and found a negative relation on firm’s sales. Other studies found a positive impact of
government lending programs on firm size. Zecchini and Ventura (2009) analyzed the
impact of an Italian credit guarantee scheme on firm performance and found a positive
influence on firm’s sales. Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert (2008) study a Spanish
credit-guarantee program and reach the similar results.
The aforementioned papers focus on the impact on firms’ sales, ignoring their position
in the final market. In our analysis, as the firms that receive project loans are large,
an otherwise positive result of a government program that yields a positive effect on
firms’ size could translate into higher levels of market power, potentially even creating or
sustaining dominant positions. For this reason, we focus our analysis not on the impact
of project loans on the absolute size of the firms, but on their relative size in respect to
their industry.
Finally, a choice has to be regarding the empirical method used in our analysis. Differ-
ent kinds of estimators are employed by the literature to evaluate the firm-level impact of
government financial assistance programs. Three of the most widely used are Heckman-
type models, fixed effects estimators and matching estimators. When only cross-section
data is available, Heckman-type models (Heckman, 1976) are used in an attempt to con-
trol for potential endogeneity caused by selection bias. Faulk (2002) and Kraybill and
Gabe (2002) both use a Heckman’s two-step model that first estimates the propensity to
participate in the government program, and then estimates the impact of the program
on firm employment taking into account that participation in the program is likely en-
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dogenous. When panel-data is available, fixed-effects estimators are often conducted to
account for time-invariant unobserved endogeneity. Dimitris (2004) uses a fixed-effects
model to determine the impact of capital subsidies on several firm performance indicators
and is able to account for the selection bias caused by observable and unobservable firm
characteristics that are constant over time.
Matching methods, promoted by Rubin (1974), have become an increasingly popu-
lar alternative to deal with selection bias as they do not require any functional form of
dependency between the outcome variable and the covariates. These methods can yield
accurate estimations even when only a few units of the control group are comparable
to the treated units (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The panel-data version of matching,
suggested by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), combines Matching with Differences-
in-Differences (MDID). This method allows to control for unobserved systematic differ-
ences between treated and untreated units, as long as they are time invariant. Smith and
Todd (2005) found that, by eliminating potential sources of temporally-invariant bias,
MDID estimators can perform substantially better than standard matching and various
traditional regression-based estimators. As only a small set of specific firms are eligible
to receive project loans, we employed a MDID estimator that restricts the analysis to the
most similar firms of the control group.
4 Methodology
4.1 Market Shares
Market power relates to the firm’s ability to sustain prices above marginal costs. Since
marginal costs are not observable, estimating firms’ market power is empirically chal-
lenging. One of the most widely used indicators of market power is market shares. In
fact, the classical procedure of competition authorities to assess market power is to start
by defining the relevant market, and subsequently measuring the market shares held by
the firms. The higher the market share of a firm has, the higher the market power it is
presumed to have (Mota, 2004).
The conventional way to measure market shares is the following:
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Si =
Salesi∑N
i=1 Salesi
, (1)
where Salesi represents the total sales (or turnover) of firm i, and N stands for the
total number of firms in the market of firm i.
There are certain methodological limitations when measuring market shares. To com-
pute it, the relevant market needs to be correctly defined, which often requires a case-
by-base analysis. Furthermore, information about all the firms operating in the defined
market is needed: in markets exposed to international trade, the relevant market is un-
likely to coincide with the internal market and information about foreign competitors
would be required. In this work project, we follow Amador and Soares (2012) assuming
the relevant geographic market of the firms being analyzed to be the Portuguese internal
market. Furthermore, each relevant product market is assumed to be delimited by the
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE)
Rev.2 at the 3-digit level. Since this assumption implies that each firm competes in only
one market, multi-product firms might be a source of bias in our analysis. The use of
statistical industry classifications to define markets is standard in cross-market studies
due to the availability of data (Du and Chen, 2010).
4.2 Empirical Method
We are interested in analyzing the effects from receiving the treatment (i.e. a project
loan). This effect can be captured by comparing the “factual performance” with the
“counterfactual performance”. The difficulty lies in finding a valid counterfactual.
In the context of a randomized controlled trial (RCT), where some indivudals are
randomly assigned to receive a certain treatment, the difference in the outcome of in-
terest between treated and untreated individuals can be attributed to the impact of the
treatment. With a large enough sample size, differences in the factors that affect the
outcome between the two groups will be averaged out and both groups will be essentially
equivalent - apart from the fact that one received the treatment, and the other did not.
However, when participation in the treatment is not random, the conclusions are not
as straightforward. If some types of individuals are more prone to receiving the treatment
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than others, then the treated and the control groups might end up being fundamentally
different, and the differences in the outcome variables of the groups might not be explained
by the treatment itself, but by other characteristics that affect the outcome variable and
differ across groups.
In our analysis, this is likely to be the case: neither is the decision to apply for a
project loan random, nor is the decision of the bank to grant the financing. For instance,
if only less leveraged firms receive project loans, then simply comparing the increase in
market shares of treated and untreated firms after the attribution of the loans might not
give us the effect of the loans, but also the influence of leverage on the firms’ market
shares. Not accounting for this would mean that our results would be inaccurate as there
would be no internal validity.
Rubin (1974) models the issue by framing the effect of the treatment in terms of
potential outcomes. For each firm i, let Yi(1) denote the potential outcome of firm i when
exposed to the treatment, and Yi(0) the outcome of firm i when not exposed to it. If both
Yi(0) and Yi(1) were observable, the effect of the treatment on firm i would be simply the
difference between the two scenarios: Yi(1) − Yi(0), and the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) would be defined by:
ATT = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Di = 1] = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]− E[Yi(1)|Di = 0], (2)
where Di is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm i received treatment.
The problem is that we can only either observe Yi(1)|D = 1 or Yi(0)|D = 0, as we
cannot observe what would have happened to a firm that received treatment if it did not
receive it, or to a firm that did not receive treatment if it did receive treatment.
The idea of matching is precisely to search for a valid counterfactual. If receiving the
treatment is random for firms with similar values of pre-treatment observable variables,
the missing outcome, Yi(1)|D = 0, can be replaced through the outcome of nonparticipant
firms with similar covariates, Yi(0)|D = 0.
Three statistical assumptions need to be fulfilled in order to obtain consistent esti-
mators. The first is the Conditional Independence assumption (CIA), also known as the
“unconfoundedness assumption” (Rosebaum and Rubin, 1983; Lechner, 2002):
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D ⊥ (Y (0), Y (1))|X (3)
This assumption means that, conditional on the observable characteristics, participa-
tion in the treatment is random. In other words, the variables that influence participation
status must be observable and controllable. For this reason, matching estimators are more
reliable when a wide range of controls are available. In our case, as we have access to
a rich database with detailed information on the balance sheet of each firm, we are able
to control for several firm-specific characteristics which we believe to influence the prob-
ability of receiving a loan. In order to avoid the treatment affecting the firms’ matching
variables, these were used in the year preceding the loan signing.
The second assumption is the Matching Assumption:
0 < P (D = 1|X = x) < 1, (4)
which requires that, for each treated unit, there is an identical untreated unit in terms
of covariates. If it would be the case that all firms of a given covariate would have received
treatment, there would not be any untreated similar firm to be used as a counterfactual.
As we have a small number of treated firms and virtually the whole universe of Portuguese
firms to be used as potential controls, this assumption is likely to hold in our sample. In
section 5.3 we further discuss about this assumption.
The third and last assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA):
Yi|(D1, D2, ..., DN) = Yi(D′1, D′2, ..., D′N) if Di = D′i, (5)
which states that the potential outcomes of the untreated units should be unaffected
by the treatment of other firms.
In our study, there are two mechanisms that could result in this assumption not
holding. First, there could be spillovers resulting from the attribution of the loans. Indeed,
one of the EIB priorities is to support projects that have positive impacts on the overall
economy. Thus, we should expect some externalities on the untreated firms derived from
the treatment of the remaining. Still, we believe this effect to be mostly insignificant
as the spillovers derived from the financed investments are usually spread out across the
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economy and not concentrated to certain groups of individuals.
The second mechanism, and perhaps most concerning, is related to the business-
stealing effect that the beneficiary firms could have over their rivals. If the remaining
firms of the market decrease investment and output in response to the treatment, our
ATT could be overestimated. It would not only include the possible positive effect on the
outcome variable derived from the loan, but also the negative effect on the counterfactuals
used.
Accordingly, there is a trade-off in our analysis. If we match more similar and closely
related firms, we are more likely to fulfill the CIA assumption. On other hand, the
SUTVA assumption is less likely to hold. For this reason, we conducted our analysis
in two different setups. First, in order to get the most similar counterfactuals possible,
we forced matched firms to belong to the same market, as defined by the 3-digit NACE
industry classification. Then we compare the results avoiding matches at same market
but forcing them to belong to the same broader industry, as defined by the 2-digit NACE
industy classification.
4.3 Differences-in-Differences Matching
In case the CIA assumption does not hold, even after controlling for observables there
may still be systematic differences between treated and untreated units. To make our
estimation more robust, we combine Matching with a Difference-in-Differences estimator
(MDID). Instead of analyzing investment and market-shares directly, we focus on changes
of these variables in respect to a pre-treatment period. This makes it possible to get
consistent estimators even if there are unobserved differences between firms who received
project loans and those who did not, as long as these differences are time-invariant.
When using this estimator, an important aspect to decide is on how long to follow
the firms after the loan has been granted. As argued by Fredrik (1998), if we choose a
too short period, we risk mispresenting the effects of the loans as they may take several
years to have real effects on the firms. Choosing a too long period, however, makes it
more difficult to isolate the effects from the loans. Following Ankarhem et al. (2010),
our differences-in-differences estimates for market shares were calculated one, three and
five years after the loan signing date. The effect on investment rate was measured first
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solely in the year of the signature, and then in the average investment on the three years
following the loan signature.
4.4 Algorithm
Finally, as different techniques imply a trade-off between bias and variance, a choice has
to be made regarding the technique used to match treated and control units. Matching
estimators that use only the best counterfactual available lead to reduced bias, as the
counterfactual will be the most similiar possible to its corresponding treated unit. How-
ever, this leads to an increase variance compared to estimators that match each treated
unit with several controls.
In this work project, we employ the Abadie and Imbens (2002) nearest-neighbor match-
ing estimator that matches each treated unit with the most similar untreated firm avail-
able. To ensure robustness, we compare the results with the case when matching each
treated unit with its three most similiar counterfacuals.
5 Description of the Data
5.1 Datasets and Data Cleaning
Two datasets were used in this work project. The first was constructed based on the
EIB’s internal loan management system (SERAPIS). The second is the Banco de Portugal
Central Balance-Sheet Database (Central de Balanc¸os, CB).
SERAPIS contains loan-specific information of all loans made by the EIB Group such
as their contract name, signature date, the amount disbursed, and the sector targeted.
For this work project, we collected data regarding project loans provided to Portugal
between 2007 and 2015 from this database.
Central de Balanc¸os contains detailed information on the balance sheet and income
statements items of virtually all non-financial Portuguese firms, using data drawn from
a survey on corporations (Informac¸a˜o Empresarial Simplificada, IES). It comprises an
unbalanced panel-data of about 350 thousand observations per year, from 2006 to 2016.
To ensure robust estimations, some observations were eliminated from this database.
Firstly, we only considered firms with strictly positive values of assets, turnover and
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number of workers. Secondly, in order to clean outliers, we eliminated all observations
below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile either in the distribution of ROA or
in the distribution of change in market share. Finally, all firms that were consider micro
according to the European Commission definition were discarded. These firms would not
provide reasonable counterfactuals as they are not eligible for the project loans.
In order to merge both databases, it was necessary to identify the firms that benefited
from each individual loan. All multi-component loans made to national or local public
entities designed to finance multiple projects were discarded, as it was impossible to trace
down the individual beneficiary firms. For the remaining, we were able to correspond
each loan with a firm. In the situations where a corporate group, rather than a single
firm, was involved in the borrowing we assumed that the beneficiary was the firm that
owned the project being selected. 2
We focused our analysis on sectors where competition issues could potentially arise
from the provision of these loans. As such we did not consider loans provided to 1) legal
monopolies such as firms of the water supply sector or the railways industry; 2) the con-
struction of roads and highways; 3) public entities that are not considered business units
(e.g. hospitals, schools, etc.). Furthermore, we did not consider loans to the telecommu-
nications sector since all the beneficiary firms identified suffered multiple mergers in the
period considered. In section 5.3 further details about the loans considered in our analysis
will be given.
5.2 Variables used
Table 1. presents the variables used in our analysis. For each year, the treatment variable
discriminates firms that received a project loan in that year from those who did not. In
order to avoid endogeneity, all the controls used were lagged one year in respect to the
loans assignment year. The control variables used in the matching are those we believe to
influence the probability of receiving a project loan. As these loans are devoted to sizeable
firms capable of implementing large projects, the number of workers (employment), the
firms’ turnover (turnover) and number of establishments (establishments) control for size
2For instance, the project “EDP REPOWERING II” involved the re-powering of two pumped storage
hydropower plants managed and owned by EDP - Gesta˜o da Produc¸a˜o de Energia, S.A. As such, we
considered this firm to be the beneficiary from the loan.
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Table 1: List of Variables
Variable Definition
Treatedi,t Dummy variable, taking value 1 if the firm received a project loan in year t
MarketSharei,t Outcome variable, calculated as the firm’s turnover over the total turnover of the market
Sectori Control variable, referring to the NACE Rev.2 industry classification at a 2 digits level
FirmAgei,t Control variable, referring to age of the firm since it was officially established
Establishmentsi,t Control variable, referring to number of establishments of the firm
Employementi,t Control variable, referring to the number of workers in the firm
Turnoveri,t Control variable, referring to the turnover of the firm
InvestmentRatei,t Control variable, calculated as the ratio of investment in tangible assets over total assets
Leveragei,t Control variable, calculated as the ratio of non-current liabilities over total assets
Return on Assets (ROA)i,t Control variable, calculated as the ratio of EBITDA over total assets
CashflowAssetsi,t Control variable, calculated as the ratio of operating net income over total assets
CashAssetsi,t Control variable, calculated as the ratio of cash and bank deposits over total assets
Trendi,t Control variable, calculated as the firms change in market share from t− 3 to t− 1
in different aspects. The age of the firm (FirmAge) might also influence its probability
to conduct new projects and apply for a loan, as well as the banks’ decision to grant the
financing. As financing particulal sectors of the economy is one of the EIB’s priorities,
a variable was added (sector). Previous investment behavior is another characteristic
we believe to be related to the probability of applying for a loan (InvestmentRate).
Furthermore, as the banks’ risk management department is involved in the decision to
grant financing, several financial ratios that proxy the financial health of the firms were
included.
Lastly, following Daniele et. al (2016), a variable was added refering to the firm-specific
trend in market share in the years preceding the treatment. It may be the case that firms
whose position in the market is shrinking (or growing) are more prone to applying for
project loans. Additionally, this allows to control for time invariant unobserved hetero-
geity that has an effect in the growth (and not in the level) of our outcome variables.
However, adding this variable decreases our sample size as we do not have access to firms’
characteristics before the year 2006. Thus, our estimations were made both including and
excluding this variable.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
The total project loans attributed to Portugal between 2007 and 2015 amounted to
11.563M euros and were mainly attributed to the Transportation and Storage industry
(29%), and to the Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply industry (22%).
As explained before, not all project loans were considered in our analysis. Our sample,
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comprising of 3.927M euros (around 34% of the total project loans), is mainly composed of
loans made to the Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply industry (61%),
and to the Manufacturing industry (29%). Apart from the fact that some loans were
discarded due to methodologic difficulties, this difference reflects mainly the susceptibility
of different industries to raising competitions concerns. To give an example, all loans to the
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities industry were
not considered in our analysis since they were attributed to legal state-owned monopolies.
It would not make sense to study whether these loans have the potential to distort the
competition of markets which, by law, are not competitive.
Table 2 includes the mean and the standard deviations of the variables used in our
analysis over the period from 2007 to 2015. It gives a sense of the differences between
firms that received project loans and those that did not. As expected, supported firms are,
on average, much larger than the remaining in different aspects: market share, turnover,
employment and number of establishments. They are also older and present higher levels
of leverage and returns on assets. These differences largely reflect the sample selection in
the application and receival of the loans.
In Table 3 we test for balance by comparing the covariates between treated firms and
their respective counterfactuals in the matching estimation 3, at the time of receiving
the treatment. We can see that the two groups are relatively homogenous in most of
the variables used, as the matching algorithm is able to focus on a small subset of firms
more comparable to the ones that received treatment. Thus, the Matching Assumption
appears to hold. Nonetheless, we should be careful with our conclusions as the average
value of some variables (namely Employement and InvestmentRate) somewhat differs
across groups.
3In the standard specification where we did not include the variable ”trend”, firms were matched in
the same industry and only one counterfactual is used per treated unit.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Treated Control
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Market Share 14,88% 27,56% 0,26% 1,85%
Turnover 5, 61 ∗ 108 1, 53 ∗ 109 8, 22 ∗ 106 6, 12 ∗ 107
Establishments 4,09 5,36 1,44 2,64
FirmAge 26,68 21,29 17,66 14,93
Employememt 654,16 797,84 30,58 99,61
InvestmentRate 0,061 0,061 0,049 0,080
Leverage 0,294 0,207 0,147 0,206
ROA 0,113 0,131 0,079 0,120
CashflowAssets 0,106 0,129 0,079 0,125
CashAssets 0,058 0,067 0,110 0,147
Table 3: Balancedness
Treated Control
Variable Mean St.Dev. ATT St.Dev.
Turnover 6.80 ∗ 108 1.51 ∗ 109 5.11 ∗ 108 1.24 ∗ 109
Establishments 3.11 3.94 3.39 3.98
FirmAge 30.5 23.42 29.25 23.38
Employement 701.79 681.56 464.54 680.62
InvestmentRate 0.113 0.257 0.049 0.044
Leverage 0.310 0.227 0.274 0.245
ROA 0.132 0.111 0.130 0.137
CashAssets 0.036 0.069 0.030 0.067
CashflowAssets 0.123 0.111 0.130 0.128
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6 Results
Table 4 to Table 11 present the estimated impact of project loans in firms’ market shares
after one, three and five years following the signing of the loans. In most of the estimated
models, no statistically significant effect of the loans on market shares was found, meaning
that beneficiary firms did not experience increases in their market shares different from
their most similar firms that did not receive a project loan.
In table 4, when firms are matched in the same market (i.e. 3-digit NACE Rev.2
classification), 17 out of the 21 estimations employed were insignificant. In the remaining
4 cases, a significant effect was found at a 5% significance level, but the sign was negative.
As such, our hypothesis that beneficiary firms would experience higher increases in their
market shares than their counterfactuals does not seem to hold for any of the estimations.
In table 5, when firms are matched in the same broader industry (i.e. 2-digit NACE
Rev.2 classification) but not in the same market, similar results were found. Out of the
21 estimations employed, 19 were insignificant and 2 were significant, at a 5% significance
level. The two significant estimations presented a negative effect on market shares 1 year
and 5 years after the loans signing.
In Table 6 and 7, we repeat the exercise including trend as a control variable. In Table
6, 11 out of the 15 estimations employed were found to be insignificant and, in Table 7,
14 out of the 15 estimations were found to be insignificant, both at a 5% significant level.
As a final robustness check, Table 8 to Table 11 present similar specifications to Table 4
to Table 7 apart from the fact that the matching algorithm used the three most similar
counterfactuals for each treated firm, instead of only one. The results were identical and
again, most of the estimations were insignificant.
Altogether, the 8 different specifications employed suggest that project loans do not
have an effect on firms’ market shares either one, three or five years following the signing
of the loans.
A different question concerns the effect of the project loans on firm’s investment rate.
In Table 12 and Table 13, the impact on firms’ investment rate at the year of receival
is estimated, first by matching firms in the same market and then in the same broader
industry. When not including trend as a control, 3 out of the 9 estimations employed
yielded significant and positive results when matching firms in the same market; and 4
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Table 4: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 5.58 4.73 1.38 3.22 0.82 5.79
2008 1.24 1.78 1.09 2.66 0.23 1.81
2009 0.75 0.52 1.64 1.75 1.18 2.08
2010 -2.96 1.38* -2.36 2.03 -3.08 2.60
2011 -0.72 0.44 -1.07 0.48* 1.43 1.00
2012 0.03 0.04 -0.50 0.12*
2013 1.18 0.86 0.58 0.39
2014 -0.18 0.07*
2015 3.23 1.84
*Firms matched in the same market, variable trend not included, one match per treated unit.
Table 5: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 -3.04 4.61 -6.82 4.39 -8.98 3.82*
2008 1.44 1.78 2.45 3.00 1.34 2.48
2009 0.23 1.40 0.69 2.76 1.14 3.60
2010 -6.19 1.90* 1.70 7.06 0.74 0.74
2011 -0.98 0.54 -1.47 0.90 -1.57 1.08
2012 1.21 0.69 3.10 2.82
2013 0.69 1.21 1.16 0.91
2014 0.08 0.36
2015 -5.26 7.96
*Firms matched in the same industry, variable trend not included, one match per treated unit.
Table 6: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2009 -1.03 1.69 0.98 1.93 0.05 2.48
2010 -2.28 1.19 -1.45 1.72 -2.33 2.60
2011 -0.72 0.44 -1.07 0.48* -1.43 1.00
2012 0.16 0.04* -0.78 0.08*
2013 0.52 0.39 0.58 0.39
2014 -0.18 0.07*
2015 3.23 1.84
*Firms matched in the same market, variable trend included, one match per treated unit.
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Table 7: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2009 3.17 1.63 5.73 3.69 1.14 3.60
2010 -3.81 2.21 -3.41 3.37 0.74 0.74
2011 -0.98 0.54 -1.47 0.90 -1.57 1.08
2012 1.21 0.69 3.10 2.82
2013 0.69 1.21 0.50 0.91
2014 -0.27 0.62
2015 -3.80 1.68*
*Firms matched in the same industry, variable trend included, one match per treated unit.
Table 8: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 2.86 2.57 -0.32 1.87 -1.14 4.29
2008 1.80 1.86 2.36 2.61 1.34 1.75
2009 0.11 1.17 0.93 1.59 0.86 2.08
2010 -3.50 1.14* -3.00 1.68 -3.87 2.29
2011 -0.14 0.85 -0.69 0.66 -0.06 1.01
2012 -0.19 0.32 -0.95 0.41*
2013 0.48 0.69 0.69 0.66
2014 -0.45 0.28
2015 2.97 1.96
*Firms matched in the same market, variable trend not included, three matches per treated unit.
Table 9: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 -0.01 2.52 -3.24 2.52 -5.04 3.12
2008 1.78 1.63 1.82 2.49 0.47 1.86
2009 2.66 3.32 2.40 3.28 3.16 3.71
2010 -4.47 1.48* -0.82 3.61 -1.82 3.97
2011 -0.66 0.46 -1.10 0.76 -1.13 0.87
2012 -0.04 0.73 -1.29 2.56
2013 0.32 0.69 0.18 1.05
2014 -0.40 0.44
2015 0.33 4.54
*Firms matched in the same industry, variable trend not included, three matches per treated unit.
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Table 10: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2009 0.09 1.11 0.79 1.61 0.75 2.11
2010 -3.45 1.15* -2.80 1.67 -3.59 2.28
2011 -0.02 0.85 -0.65 0.66 -0.09 1.01
2012 -0.19 0.32 -0.95 0.41*
2013 0.35 0.45 0.61 0.36
2014 -0.03 0.26
2015 3.01 1.99
*Firms matched in the same market, variable trend included, three matches per treated unit
Table 11: ATT Estimates on Market Shares (percentage points)*
After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2009 1.21 4.13 2.61 3.35 3.15 3.82
2010 -3.38 1.13* -3.35 1.70* -4.33 2.30
2011 -0.67 0.46 -1.10 0.76 -1.14 0.87
2012 -0.15 0.83 -1.29 2.56
2013 0.16 0.53 -0.07 0.90
2014 0.66 1.21
2015 0.38 4.56
*Firms matched in the same industry, variable trend included, three match per treated unit.
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Table 12: ATT Estimates on Investment Rate at signing year (percentage points)*
Excluding Trend Including Trend
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 1.68 1.06 - -
2008 -1.12 1.53 - -
2009 4.73 2.30* 4.87 2.13*
2010 2.05 5.00 2.03 5.00
2011 -1.33 2.68 -1.33 2.68
2012 6.42 2.22* 6.42 2.22*
2013 0.31 0.13* 0.31 0.13*
2014 -5.01 2.67 -5.01 2.67
2015 -0.73 0.33* -0.73 0.33*
*Firms matched in the same market, one match per treated unit.
Table 13: ATT Estimates on Investment Rate at signing year (percentage points)*
Excluding Trend Including Trend
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 0.04 1.12 - -
2008 1.33 2.96 - -
2009 15.42 5.51* 12.64 4.65*
2010 10.63 9.53 10.63 9.53
2011 -3.51 2.62 -2.11 3.32
2012 6.62 2.36* 6.62 2.36*
2013 0.31 0.13* 0.31 0.13*
2014 12.37 6.01* 8.98 8.31*
2015 -1.65 0.84 -1.65 0.84
*Firms matched in the same industry, one match per treated unit.
out of the 9 estimations were significant and positive when matching firms in the same
broad industry. The results are similar when including trend as a control. All in all, these
exercises suggest that there is a positive impact in the firms’ investment rate at the year
of receival.
However, when looking at the average effect of the investment rate in the three years
following the loan signature, the effect vanishes. When matching firms in the same market,
only 1 out of the 9 estimations employed were positive and statistically significant when
not including trend, and no positive and signinficant effect was found when including
trend (Table 14). The same happens when matchng firms in the same broader industry
(Table 15). These results suggest that project loans do not have an effect on firms’ average
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Table 14: ATT Estimates on Investment Rate of three following years (percentage points)*
Excluding Trend Including Trend
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 1.07 0.72 - -
2008 -1.20 1.43 - -
2009 2.21 1.07* 4.21 2.28
2010 -2.73 2.23 -3.02 2.34
2011 -1.99 3.30 -1.99 3.30
2012 2.67 3.15 2.67 3.15
2013 2.02 1.33 2.02 1.33
2014 0.48 1.36 0.48 1.36
2015 -1.44 0.58* -1.44 0.58*
*Firms matched in the same market, one match per treated unit.
Table 15: ATT Estimates on Investment Rate of three following years (percentage points)*
Excluding Trend Including Trend
Year of loan signing ATT St.err. ATT St.err.
2007 -0.26 1.34 - -
2008 -1.22 1.44 - -
2009 5.01 2.01* 2.95 2.27
2010 -3.57 2.35 -3.57 2.35
2011 -2.08 3.13 -1.79 3.17
2012 2.66 3.15 2.66 3.15
2013 2.02 1.33 2.02 1.33
2014 10.69 8.53 9.76 9.20
2015 4.74 3.00 -3.46 1.98
*Firms matched in the same industry, one match per treated unit.
investment rate in the three years following the loans signing. The same conclusions hold
when we match three firms per treated unit.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to study whether EIB project loans could be distorting com-
petition in goods and services markets by giving the large beneficiary firms an artificial
advantage over their rivals. This would be inconsistent with Article 140 of the Financial
Regulation of the EU (Regulation 966/2012), which states that the EU financial instru-
ments should only be used in a way that does not distort competition in the internal
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market.
Our main result is that project loans do have a statistically significant impact on
firms’ market shares. More specifically, we find that the firms that received project loans
did not experience increases in their market shares larger than comparable firms that did
not receive a project loan. This result is robust to different specifications and matching
techniques. As such, we fail to reject the hypothesis that project loans do not distort
market competition and reinforce the position of already large and potentially dominant
firms.
To better explore this result, we analyzed the impact of project loans on firms’ in-
vestment decisions. While we find that project loans may increase investment at the year
of receival, its impact in the average investment of the years following the loans signing
is negligible. In other words, even if indeed there is an initial increase in investment,
this effect is found to be offset by the decrease in investment in the years following the
loan signature. This result goes in line with several authors (Abel, 1982; Auerbach and
Hines, 1988; Adda and Cooper, 2000; Bronzini and Blasio, 2006) that found that a time-
substitution effect whereby firms bring forward investment projects, in the present of
government investment incentives, while keeping constant their lifetime investments.
As argued by Honohan (1995), the EIB can be advantageous in the presence of fi-
nancial constraints which could either be explained by inefficient and costly domestic
banking systems, or by the difficulty in raising large amounts of capital to finance size-
able projects. However, as capital markets become more developed, these market failures
are becoming less significant (Honohan, 1995). Furthermore, as financial constraints tend
to be more relevant for younger and smaller firms (Gertler, 1988), it is not so obvious
that the larger firms eligible for project loans have difficulty in arranging credit in the
market by themselves. As a result, firms might resort to the EIB not because there is
not an alternative lender, but simply because the EIB offers more attractive conditions.
Accordingly, receiving EIB project loans financing may have no major impact on firms’
investment. If the subsidy effect underlying the favorable conditions of the loans is not
too large, we may expect a negligible impact on firms’ market shares.
A possible limitation of our analysis lies is that the effect of the loans might not be
large enough to be distinguished from the noise prevenient from the firms’ usual economic
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activity. In fact, the average loan of our sample amounts to 87,27M euros, which translates
to 1,56% of the average annual turnover of the treated firms, and 13,72% of their average
annual investment in tangible assets. If there are lenders alternative to the EIB, the actual
impact of receiving a project loan (usually comprising more attractive conditions) might
be minor and hard to be isolated using standard econometric techniques. Nonetheless,
this would suggest the competition concerns derived from these loans to be small, and
likely outweighed by possible accomplishments in different objective areas of the bank.
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